Syria’s Centralization Advances Amid Kurdish Deal and Regional Rivalry

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has appointed Mazloum Abdi, the former leader of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as an advisor to the Presidency of the Republic. The appointment was made through Decree No. 164 and announced three days after Abdi declared the dissolution of the SDF and the completion of its integration into the Syrian military. Abdi is the most senior Kurdish figure to receive a position in the Syrian government. The appointment is less influential than an offer made in January, when al-Sharaa proposed that Abdi become deputy defence minister and governor of Hasakah province. That proposal was intended to help restore central government control over the province and integrate the SDF into state institutions. Al-Sharaa and Abdi first agreed in March 2025 to incorporate the SDF into the central government, but the agreement made little progress before its year-end deadline. Fighting subsequently broke out in northeastern Syria, with government forces capturing Raqqa and Deir Az Zor from the SDF in January. A later ceasefire placed those cities, as well as Hasakah, under central government control and committed the SDF to joining the defence and interior ministries under a 14-point plan. The SDF’s women’s units, known as the YPJ, remain outside the military structure. Although they requested integration into the defence ministry, they were told that the army has no units for women. Alongside the military integration process, al-Sharaa issued a January decree recognizing Kurdish as a national language and restoring citizenship to Syrian Kurds. The dissolution of the SDF leaves Damascus with formal authority over nearly all Syrian territory, advancing al-Sharaa’s stated goal of reunifying the country after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024.

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has appointed Mazloum Abdi, the longtime commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as a presidential adviser. The appointment follows Abdi’s announcement that the SDF would dissolve under an agreement to integrate its fighters and institutions into Syria’s central government, marking a significant rapprochement between two sides that were adversaries during the country’s civil war. For more than a decade, Abdi led the SDF, which partnered with the United States to defeat Islamic State and controlled large areas of northern and eastern Syria. The force also established governing institutions and helped administer a semi-autonomous region. After Bashar al-Assad was ousted in late 2024 by a rebel coalition led by al-Sharaa, the new Islamist-led authorities demanded that SDF-held territory and institutions be brought under state control. Negotiations stalled for more than a year, but a January offensive by Syrian government forces against Abdi’s fighters led to a framework for integration. Abdi later described the SDF’s dissolution as the beginning of a new period of peace and participation in building Syria. It remains unclear whether his advisory position will carry substantial authority or be primarily ceremonial. The agreement provides for SDF fighters, including senior commanders previously critical of Damascus, to join Syria’s Defence Ministry. Sipan Hamo, a Kurdish commander who had suggested that Israel strike Syrian troops during the January fighting, was later appointed deputy defence minister. The future role of the SDF’s female fighters remains unresolved because Syria’s armed forces otherwise have no women serving in combat roles. Turkey, a close ally of al-Sharaa, welcomed the SDF’s dissolution. Ankara has long accused the group of being linked to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK.

Syria’s Kurds have agreed to end their nearly 14-year experiment in autonomous rule. Under a new arrangement, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will be integrated into the national military, and the oil-rich northeastern areas they controlled will return to the authority of Damascus. The decision effectively leaves Sweida province, where much of Syria’s Druze minority lives, as the only significant area still resisting central-government control. The development undermines a broader vision of a decentralized or fragmented Syria, previously supported by Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and Kurdish leader Mazloum Abdi. Their proposed model involved autonomous regions for the Alawites, Kurds and Druze. With Kurdish autonomy ending, al-Hijri has emphasized the Druze community’s relationship with Israel, even describing the Druze as an “inseparable part” of Israel. Analysts say, however, that Israeli annexation of Sweida would be difficult because of geography, demographics and the province’s continued reliance on Damascus for public services, salaries, utilities and pensions. The rift between Sweida and the Syrian government deepened after intercommunal violence in July 2025 between Druze and Bedouin communities. Government forces that entered ostensibly to restore order were accused of attacking Druze communities. A UN report said more than 1,700 people died and that Druze, Bedouin and government-aligned forces may all have committed war crimes. A proposed Jordanian- and American-backed roadmap has made little progress, while accountability for the violence remains limited. Rather than launch a major offensive, Damascus has adopted a cautious strategy intended to wait out al-Hijri’s faction and exploit its difficulties providing services. Analysts describe al-Hijri’s rule as authoritarian and say opponents have been expelled, abducted or killed. The article concludes that the future of Sweida will likely depend less on al-Hijri than on external actors, particularly Israel, the United States and the outcome of possible Syrian-Israeli security negotiations. The supplied article ends mid-sentence while discussing that potential deal.

The article examines the growing power struggle between Israel and Turkey over influence in Syria following the fall of Bashar Al Assad’s regime. Israel has continued striking targets in Syria and conducting incursions in the south, officially saying it is targeting weapons and military assets linked to the former government. However, the article says Israel’s recent attack on the Abu Al Duhur military airfield in Idlib was viewed differently because it appeared to be directed at Turkey. Israeli officials alleged that Turkey had stationed troops at the airbase, but both the Turkish and Syrian governments rejected the claim. The strikes drew criticism from Tom Barrack, the US special envoy to Syria and ambassador to Ankara, who described them as unnecessary and deeply concerning. The incident has raised fears that competition between Israel and Turkey could trigger further regional escalation. The confrontation comes as President Ahmad Al Shara’s government attempts to establish stability with Syria’s neighbours, with backing from Washington. At the same time, stalled negotiations between Israel and Syria resumed in Jordan, partly because the US is seeking to reduce tensions. Despite these diplomatic efforts, the article suggests that Israel and Turkey’s competing efforts to secure strategic influence in post-Assad Syria will make a lasting settlement difficult. The podcast episode analyzes the motivations behind the confrontation. Host Nada AlTaher speaks with Noah Bonsey, a senior adviser on Syria at the International Crisis Group, and Danny Citrinowicz, a senior fellow at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, about the interests of the two regional powers and the risks posed by their rivalry.