9/11 Warnings, Crisis Decisions, and Lasting Policy Mistakes

Michael Morell, George W. Bush’s daily intelligence briefer on September 11, 2001, recounts how an ordinary presidential visit in Florida became a national emergency. Morell had briefed Bush earlier that morning at the Colony Resort Hotel and said terrorism was not discussed, contradicting some later accounts. While traveling with senior White House staff to Emma E. Booker Elementary School, he learned that a plane had struck the World Trade Center. Initially, he considered the possibility of a small aircraft accident, but a call to the CIA operations center confirmed that a large commercial jet was involved. The impact of a second plane made clear that the United States was under attack. As the Secret Service moved Bush away from the school, staff prepared statements and attempted to determine whether further attacks were imminent. The president was flown first to Louisiana and then to Nebraska aboard Air Force One. During the flight, Bush summoned Morell and asked who was responsible. Although Morell acknowledged that countries such as Iran or Iraq had the capability to conduct such an attack, he reasoned that doing so would not serve their interests. Based on the intelligence focus of the previous nine months, he told Bush that the investigation would likely lead to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. When Bush asked when the perpetrators would be identified, Morell explained that analysts would need to place the event in context and that attribution could take anywhere from two or three days to much longer. Morell later learned that the CIA had reached the same preliminary conclusion and had conveyed it directly to Bush. The account emphasizes the confusion, urgency and surreal atmosphere surrounding the attacks, while offering a firsthand explanation of the decisions and intelligence judgments made during the first hours of the crisis.

Twenty-five years after the September 11, 2001 attacks, former US diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad has reflected on decisions made by the United States in the aftermath and identified several mistakes. In an interview with journalist Alex Marquardt on Al Jazeera’s This is America, Khalilzad said fear, anger and pressure to act quickly shaped US policy. The attacks killed nearly 3,000 people and led to the US invasion of Afghanistan less than a month later, beginning a war that lasted almost two decades. Khalilzad, who served on the National Security Council during the administration of President George W Bush and later became the US ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations, expressed regret that Washington did not negotiate with or include the Taliban in Afghanistan’s political process. He said the decision was influenced by post-9/11 anger and the United States’ position as a global superpower. The Taliban fought US-backed forces for two decades before retaking power after the US withdrawal in 2021. He also acknowledged that the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was based on flawed intelligence regarding alleged weapons of mass destruction. Khalilzad said that, without 9/11, the United States probably would not have attacked Iraq, suggesting that fear of another surprise attack helped transform a policy of containment into regime change. Khalilzad supported the eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan, arguing that the war could have continued indefinitely and that the terrorist threat that initially motivated the intervention had been substantially reduced. Although the withdrawal was widely criticised, he said the Taliban’s return has, surprisingly, produced a relationship that has been beneficial to US counterterrorism interests.

The CIA has released several dozen declassified presidential daily briefing documents concerning Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, marking the 25th anniversary of the September 11, 2001, attacks. The documents cover intelligence gathered before and immediately after the attacks, which killed nearly 3,000 people and significantly reshaped US national security policy. The records describe efforts by US intelligence analysts to track bin Laden’s movements, support network, financing and activities in Afghanistan, the United States and other countries. They also document concerns that his organization was seeking weapons of mass destruction and planning attacks against US targets. CIA Director John Ratcliffe called the release “an act of exceptional transparency” and said it was the agency’s largest publication of declassified presidential daily briefs. Among the records is a February 1998 briefing for President Bill Clinton titled “Terrorists Seeking WMD Capability.” An April 1998 document said the Taliban was reluctant to surrender bin Laden because of his assistance during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Later that year, intelligence officials assessed that bin Laden preferred to attack the United States on its own soil, potentially by flying an explosive-filled aircraft into a US city. A December 1998 briefing discussed possible hijackings, including security-evasion tests at an unidentified New York airport and hijacking training received by members of bin Laden’s network. Other documents described al-Qaeda’s attempts to develop “dirty bombs” and experiments intended to increase the energy output of explosives. A September 12, 2001, report said the attacks had been planned for two years and may also have targeted the US Capitol. Although the documents contain extensive intelligence warnings, many are redacted and do not appear to reveal major new information about the attacks or the government’s understanding of them.